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
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
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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AGGREGATE MIND OF AN AUDIENCE

By GIDEON H. DIAL

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AGGREGATE MIND OF AN AUDIENCE

I

INTRODUCTION

From a psychological standpoint, man is both an individual and a unit in a group of individuals. The isolated mind has been the subject for the science of psychology during all time, but the scientific study of mind in an aggregation of individuals has been practically left untouched. Yet, from the moment when as a babe he opens his eyes, till his death, man always finds himself a member of some group of minds. In the home, at school, at play, in business, in social gatherings, in church work, and in everything he does, he never acts as an independent, isolated individual, but always as a member of some group. As sure as this is so, is the individual influenced by the minds around him. So we may say that the psychology of the aggregate mind is as broad as the psychology of the isolated mind. In a certain sense of the word, the psychology of the aggregate mind is the psychology of the individual applied to practical life. Again, we may say that the individual mind affords the only

means to approach the study of psychology. Yet the psychology of the isolated mind is not necessarily the whole science. The aggregation of minds may furnish us as important a factor in the science as the study of the individual.

To begin with, the importance of the psychology of the aggregate mind is self-evident, since it is the practical side of the science. For a clear scientific understanding of the laws governing a group of individual minds would at least give the world a new applied science of great value. If these laws were established, they would give a sounder, safer basis for the handling of such groups by leaders, and would furnish the individuals of mental aggregates with a better, deeper knowledge of themselves by disclosing one of the important factors which influence their lives.

A knowledge of these laws would answer such questions as these: "How do successful lawyers deal with juries? What method do they pursue in addressing a bench of judges? How are town-meetings governed by a few words from a few plain men? What is the reason that an educated man sometimes fails in such an assembly, outgeneraled by a farmer or a blacksmith? Why is it that an oration, as a rule, fails as a piece of literature? How is the city mob quelled by a dozen men with no weapons more deadly than a billy? Why are a dozen policemen a match for a hundred desperadoes? Why do panics occur? Why will a crowd respond to the same stimulus in a way totally different

from an individual? What is the reason for fads and fashions? In short, what is the psychological basis of an oration, of a sermon, of an address to a jury, of the mob-mind?"

The standpoint from which psychology will be viewed in this analysis of the aggregate mind is not that of the fatalist, nor that of the freedomist. The fatalist's view of psychology is the materialistic one, which may be defined as follows: "By materialism is meant the doctrine that the mental subject is nothing substantial, and that mental facts are produced by the physical organism" alone. In other words, that the mental states are molecules of the brain in different relations. The freedomist takes the other extreme. He grounds his theory of psychology on the hypothesis that mind is the only factor to take into consideration, leaving the brain entirely alone. This, of course, is idealism pure and simple. On the contrary, our standpoint will be that of the modern school, in which there is a union of the ideas just expressed above—the school by which the mind and the brain are assigned their proper places in the science. So, with this ground under us, we may observe that the aggregate mind can not be the fusing of the individual brains of a group into a new brain which would consist of a peculiar arrangement and relation of the molecules of the isolated brains present. For, from the very nature of the case, such a composite product could not be the object of scientific study by an individual mind, since the indi-

vidual would be destroyed in the common brain of the group. Nor, on the other hand, is the aggregate mind an impossibility as the freedomist, who asserts that only individual minds exist, would have us believe. For a union of these two theories would, at least, admit of an aggregate mind in so far as all minds have common mental states. The very existence of the science of psychology depends upon the similarity of all brains and minds. Without the fact that there is a common set of psychical laws governing all minds and brains the field of psychology would be in a state of chaos. So the underlying and essential hypothesis of the science of psychology furnishes the ground of a common mind composed of the common mental states found in all individuals. Of course, after a certain point of development, different in each brain, these elements cease to be common, and from this differentiation we have the individual. Let it be clearly understood that the common mind does not exist before the individual, but that the common mind is a necessary deduction from the individual mind, if there is to be a basis for a science of psychology.

Besides the above self-evident fact of a common ground in all minds, we have another phenomenon that is the common experience of all. It is as follows: given a certain stimulus, a group of minds and an individual will react under it in different ways. There is always something about a group of minds which manifests a strained, intense degree of mental activity,

a hyper-excitability to casual impressions, and a corresponding lack of control of ordinary individual emotions. The individual is so small a part of the whole that he becomes overawed, as it were, by the impression of the latent mental and bodily interest accumulated around him. Thus, the most vapid joke oftentimes produces an applause which is proportionate to the size of the audience rather than to its supposed intelligence. The most trivial mishap awakens the most foolish terror. Excitement, irritability, and then fear rapidly follow each other on the slightest provocation. What would be trivial to an individual is terrible to a crowd. The slightest exciting cause may start a train of the most unreasonable apprehensions, which becomes intensified in proportion to the demonstrated difficulty of escape. A case in point is the recent panic in the vast crowd on the Hodynky Plain in Russia, with its insignificant cause and its frightful loss of life. Another apt example would be the scene enacted when William J. Bryan was nominated at the Chicago convention in 1896. To furnish more illustrations of this law that individuals when in a group, and when by themselves, are affected differently by the same stimulus is needless, since common experience and history are full of them.

From the foregoing we can deduce certain principles of the problem under consideration, which are not open to discussion or difference of opinion. These are the following: All brains and minds are similar, and

hence possess certain elements in common. In these common elements we have, at least, the possibility of an aggregate mind. Next, given the same stimulus, an individual and a group of minds will react under it in different ways. This points to a hypothesis that the individual mind is governed apparently by a different set of laws when a member of a group, and when by itself. While this does not necessarily show the existence of an aggregate mind, it certainly points to the possibility of such a mental phenomenon.

The problem which gives this investigation its life, and the one which we shall attempt to solve together, is this: "Is there an aggregate mind?" If the answer is in the negative, the problem will be dropped. If the answer is in the affirmative, we shall then proceed to analyze the laws controlling the aggregate mind, and from these laws undertake to discover its individuality or personality.

The psychology of the aggregate mind is as broad as the experiences of man. So, for the sake of accomplishing something definite, we shall confine ourselves to the problem of the aggregate mind of an audience. Two other reasons for this course are: First, we have collected data bearing only upon this branch of the subject. Second, the audience is a good type, as we shall see, of an aggregate mind, since it contains more of the possible elements of the mental aggregate than perhaps any other group of individuals does.

In order that the full scope and intention of this in-

vestigation may be thoroughly understood at the beginning, the list of questions which was sent to two hundred and fifty of the leading orators, lawyers, lecturers, preachers and psychologists of this country is here presented. The persons to whom these questions were sent were very carefully selected, with the advice of President Gobin of DePauw University, and Professor J. B. DeMotte, both of whom have a wide acquaintance with public speakers. The basis of selection was the number of years' experience each person had had on the platform, and his general fitness to answer. Of the two hundred and fifty, sixty-eight answered. Among these are Leland Powers, Bishop C. C. McCabe, Rev. James Hedley of Cleveland, Hon. George R. Wendling, Rev. Emory Haynes of New York, Dr. G. Walter Barr, Professor J. B. DeMotte, President Gobin of DePauw University, and other men of like experience as public speakers. With the exception of Professor J. B. DeMotte, who enters a general denial of the existence of such a thing as an aggregate mind, the other sixty-seven answers received were unanimous in stating that an aggregate mind not only is possible, but exists. The following is the list of questions:

1. Do you consider the minds of your audiences made up of isolated individual minds, or are the individual minds fused into an aggregate mind?
2. What are the common elements of the individual minds which form the aggregate mind?

3. What is the force of the environment in marking the standard of the aggregate mind of an audience?

4. Classify audiences from your own experience; as, popular lecture audiences, church congregations, juries, etc. Give the elements of the mind peculiar to each audience.

5. What is the attention of an audience, and how do you gain it?

6. What part and force has the volitional element in the aggregate mind?

7. What part do the emotions play?

8. What part does the imagination play in the aggregate mind?

9. What part do the instincts have?

10. What part and force does reasoning hold?

11. What constitutes the pull of an audience on a speaker?

12. Do you, as an orator, see or hear your efforts as you write or compose them?

13. Does your audience see or hear your efforts when they are delivered? Which is the more predominant and effective in the aggregate mind?

14. Does the speaker fit himself to an audience, or does he fit an audience to himself?

15. Is the aggregate mind higher or lower than the individual mind of an audience?

16. How do prejudice, partisan feeling, local pride and all narrow biases control the aggregate mind?

17. Is the aggregate mind pliable and easily influenced, or is it stable?

18. Is the moral standard of an audience high or low, selfish or self-sacrificing?

19. Is public speaking an effective way of influencing men?

20. Is the responsibility of speakers great or little?

21. If you have any facts or laws governing audiences, gained from experience, that these questions fail to call out, please give them.

The answers received from these questions, as has been intimated, furnish some original scientific data rich in material to work upon. We shall, doubtless, be able to deduce facts and principles which will enable us to solve our own problem correctly, and will contribute to this much neglected but very important branch of the science of psychology some good, sound, scientific results of great practical value.

The purely scientific method will be pursued—we shall proceed from the known to the unknown. First, enough of the psychology of the individual will be presented to establish a common ground and starting point. Next, the scientific data collected will be given to furnish facts. Then we shall deduce the principles and laws that such facts taken into consideration with the known psychical laws of the individual, will warrant.

All audiences are not alike. So, before entering this problem directly, it will be necessary to make a classi-

fication of them, that we may know what species of audience we have under consideration. C. L. Herrick, in response to question four, gives the following brief, concise, conclusive classification of audiences: "Audiences can be divided into professional; that is, such as have by virtue of their vocation a preadjustment towards the address to be given; into scholastic, forensic, ethico-religious, industrial, etc. Next, into popular audiences, which are the least critical of all groups of minds, and require to be entertained more than anything else. Next, into phillipic or kinetic; that is, such audiences as are to be moved to action. Some examples of this kind of audience are political meetings, church revivals, and emergency meetings—such as military, philanthropic, etc."

While audiences can be classified as above, yet the difference between the three—the professional, the popular and the phillipic audience—when viewed from the standpoint of the aggregate mind, is not so vital as one may think. Let us develop this idea of the similarity of all audiences more clearly. G. Walter Barr gives the following as the result of his experience: "All these audiences are alike when fused into an aggregate mind. My experience personally has been with the church, popular, scholastic (post-graduate students) and jury audiences. Juries seldom aggregate their minds, because they are critical and wary of the wiles of the lawyers. My own experience has been as an expert witness, giving me an advantage over the plead-

ers, but I find it much harder to fuse a jury than any other kind of an audience. I have often noticed a court-room audience fuse long before the jury. Next hardest to fuse are church audiences, because attendance is from so many motives, and attention is seldom general. Next comes the post-graduate (scientific class), which is very critical with its teachers, but yet appreciative. The easiest to fuse is a popular audience, because attention means interest, and usually they are not sufficiently informed to be hypercritical. Yet, when they are fused into an aggregate mind, all these different kinds of audiences are alike."

The only difference in audiences, as is shown by the foregoing, is not a vital one after all. After they have been fused, they are all alike—the only difference is that some fuse more readily than others. So audiences seem to fall into an ascending scale, wherein the difference lies in the degree of the critical preadjustment which must be broken down before an aggregate mind can exist.

Audiences are relative; depending on nationality, local environments, etc., to form their peculiar individuality. William Matthews, in his book entitled *Oratory and Orators*, brings this fact out as follows: "While there are certain qualities which all discourses should have in common, yet there are others which must vary with the varying capacity, degrees of intelligence, taste and affections of those who are addressed. The style of oratory that is fitted to enkindle the enthusiasm of

Frenchmen, would provoke only the merriment of Englishmen. The English are grave, matter-of-factish, sententious and argumentative; the French, ardent, discursive and brilliant. . . . Again, a speech addressed to an audience of scholars exacts very different qualities from one addressed to the common people. The orator who throws a congregation of illiterate enthusiasts into tears would raise affections of a very different kind, should he attempt to proselyte an American Senate; and, again, the finest speaker that ever swayed a Parliamentary assembly, might try in vain to rouse or allay the passions of an uneducated mob."

Mr. Matthews has stated here only what G. Walter Barr said above in a different way. Both say that the means of bringing about the aggregate minds may vary, and of necessity must vary, with each type of audience; yet, after a group has been fused, all aggregate minds are similar. Briefly stated, the means may differ, but the end is the same.

II

IS THERE AN AGGREGATE MIND

All that has been attempted so far, has been along the line of clearing the field of obstructions and stating the problem plainly, with the method to be followed. So, with the ground prepared, we can now enter upon the problem that must be settled first before all others—the problem upon the correct solution of which depends the development of all the rest of this inquiry. Briefly stated, it is—"Is there any aggregate mind?" In solving it, we have practically no recognized authorities to ground ourselves upon. As a matter of fact, the subject of the aggregate mind has never been scientifically treated. The references to this question in books are to be found only in isolated passages scattered here and there, wherein the authorities merely allude to or give in detail illustrations from their own experiences or those of others, which seem to show that a number of minds acting together are affected by the same stimulus differently from individuals. A German author, Robert Schellwein, has published a book entitled *The Will*, in which he treats indirectly the volitional element in the minds of a group of individuals. The Hon. Lloyd Bryce, in a recent *North American*

Review, has an article entitled "A Study of Campaign Audiences," wherein he treats some phases of this problem from a literary standpoint. Professor Edward A. Ross, in the July (1897) *Popular Science Monthly*, writes in a pleasant literary manner on "The Mob Mind." Gustave Le Bon has a book entitled *The Crowd*, which, though it does not bear on this subject directly, furnishes some interesting facts. Outside of these writings practically nothing is to be found on the subject. Still, the newspapers may be considered also. They furnish numerous examples of the aggregate mind in all its phases; but this source is not very scientific. Again, in the text-books on oratory and elocution, the relation of a speaker to an audience, and of an audience to a speaker is treated in the philosophical rather than the scientific method, and we have generally as many theories as books. Consequently we secure no valuable assistance from them. If the scientific study of the aggregate mind of an audience has no other result, it will aid the natural school of oratory in gaining a truer and deeper basis than the one it now has. Yet these text-books give us one fact that is well worth considering—in all of them the art of public speaking is shown to be different from the art of conversation, as the temper and understanding of a crowd differs from the temper and understanding of an individual. Macaulay, in his essay on the "Athenian Orators," brings this fact out clearly as follows: "From the early habits of taking a share in animated discussion, the

intelligent student would derive that readiness of resource, that copiousness of language, that knowledge of the temper and understanding of an audience which are far more valuable to an orator than the greatest logical powers." Macaulay has here enunciated a principle that the work of every orator substantiates. Henry Ward Beecher understood thoroughly the temper of his Liverpool audience, and turned a crowd that was organized to break up the meeting into awed listeners. Geo. P. Baker, in his book entitled *Specimens of Argumentation*, says the following in regard to Beecher's method of handling his hostile English audiences: "In this speech (the Liverpool address) Beecher first tried to win a hearing by making his audience feel that he was undaunted, determined, sincere, ready in speech, and by appealing to the innate love of all Englishmen for fair play. Then carefully avoiding all reference to the great moral reasons why the English should have supported the North, and all the objections to the course of the North that must bring exciting debate, he sought some interest of his audience to which he could appeal with some certainty of a hearing. This he found in the pocketbooks of the manufacturers and the men employed by them. Knowing that the men at least believed that the South gave them a market for their goods, he devoted himself to showing that a free South would give them a far greater market. Boldly taking for his central idea the very opinion on which the opposition to him most rested, he disposed

of it before touching for a moment on great moral reasons for supporting the North, and before taking up some of the objections to the course of the North that must meet him. Wherever he spoke, Beecher selected with great care the interest to which he wished to appeal. In Manchester he discussed the effect of slavery on manufacturing interest; in Glasgow, where the blockade runners were building and the laboring classes were in this way bribed by their work to sympathize with the South, he spoke of the degrading effect on labor of the growth of slavery; in Edinburgh, a literary center, he spoke of the philosophy, the history of slavery." Wendell Phillips, in his anti-slavery orations, also applied this principle. Like Beecher, he played with his audiences, seemingly as a cat plays with a mouse. By a thorough understanding of the temper of an audience, he charmed organized bands of rowdies into friends and listeners. From Carlos Martyn's *Wendell Phillips the Agitator*, we take the following illustration of that power: "Take as an illustration of his adroitness in managing an unruly crowd a passage from his speech at the Lovejoy meeting in Faneuil Hall, Boston, which made him famous away back at the outset of his career—that marvelous extempore reply to Attorney-General Austin. He had asserted that Lovejoy had been murdered for defending the freedom of the press. Then he added: 'The disputed right which provoked the Revolution—taxation without representation—is far beneath that for which he died.'

(Here there was a strong and general expression of disapprobation, as though he were belittling the heroes of 1776.) With a commanding gesture, Mr. Phillips cried: 'One word, gentlemen. As much as thought is better than money, so much is the cause in which Lovejoy died nobler than a mere question of taxes. James Otis thundered in this hall when the king did but touch his pocket. Imagine, if you can, his indignant eloquence, had England offered to put a gag upon his lips (tremendous cheering).'' Antony's masterly address to the Romans shows how completely Shakespeare understood the controlling elements in a group of individual minds working in unison. Antony takes a mob, hostile to his purpose, and swings it around to his point of view so absolutely that his will becomes the mob's completely. His speech is one of the shrewdest, most adroit pieces of oratory ever formulated, and this scene in the drama of Julius Cæsar furnishes a complete study of the aggregate mind in all its various phases. The series of campaign speeches which Hon. Bourke Cockran delivered on his Western campaign tour in 1896 gives one an illustration of how clearly this great orator understands the mind of an audience. It was through this knowledge of the temper of his auditors that he was able in nearly every speech to control their minds and shape their thoughts in accordance with his own; especially is this clearly shown in the Omaha, Nebraska, and the Evansville, Indiana, meetings. The effects gained by Mr. Cockran in these campaign

speeches can not be traced to their true cause unless we posit that an audience has an individuality of its own. The Hon. Lloyd Bryce, who accompanied Mr. Bourke Cockran on this trip, has the following to say about the Omaha meeting: "Here we had an audience, hostile as a whole—at least one-quarter of which had gone with the deliberate purpose of breaking up the meeting at any cost—an attempt organized and disciplined. We had been informed of the trouble before we arrived in the town, and later in the day in the town itself, from the crowds that surrounded the hotel to meet us, a man drew me to one side and begged me to warn my friend that he would never be allowed to speak in Mr. Bryan's state. The whole meeting was against the speaker—uproariously and bitterly. To what psychological cause can we attribute the change from hostility to a demonstration in his favor that I have never seen equaled? I speak not without experience, for I have attended public meetings in many parts of the world. It is not alone his gift of language, nor entirely his argument, great as it was. All these were factors in the change. There was also the instinctive appreciation of an underlying sympathy with them, on the part of the speaker, which disarmed their distrusts and the vast gathering responded to it with greater quickness and fervor than any one of them would have done individually."

Although in the above examples we have not necessarily proved scientifically that such a phenomenon as

an aggregate mind composed of the individual minds of the group exists, yet we can certainly assert that not only does the individual mind when in a group, and when alone, act differently and appear to be governed by a peculiar set of psychical laws in each instance, but we can state that, at least, the scientific grounds of one have been developed; i. e., an aggregate mind composed of the common elements of the individual minds of the audience controlled seemingly by a set of laws peculiarly its own. This is certainly a step towards the aggregate mind of the problem before us, and may safely be taken as soon as we can solve the question, "Why does a group of minds respond in one way to a given stimulus, and an individual mind in another?"

Another important factor to the complete solution of the problem under consideration is, whether or not we can work out the individuality or personality of an aggregate mind by finding what are the common mental states of the individual minds that enter into a mental aggregate. If we can find these out, we can not only discover the personality of an aggregate mind, but also answer intelligently and correctly the question asked above. But before going deeper into these vital questions, which are the heart of our problem, let us have the evidence of some of the leading men in the field of public speaking, in answer to the general question how the mind of an audience has impressed them individually. In other words, do they regard an audience as composed of individual minds alone, or have

they been impressed by experience that such a thing as an aggregate mind exists?

Leland Powers says: "The mind of an audience, it seems to me, is made up of the individual minds run together into an aggregate mind. Not an average mind, such as might be represented by the sum of the individual minds divided by the number of auditors present, but rather a common mind, made up of those characteristics which are common to all the individual minds present in the audience, from the most uncultured to the most cultivated."

Rev. James Hedley, the veteran platform lecturer, says: "The individual minds are run together into an aggregate mind. I never think of convincing or of trying to convince or instruct or entertain any one individual mind or any selected few minds, but the audience. It is a whole to me, to be captured and carried."

Bishop C. C. McCabe gives as the result of his extended experience on the public platform: "I address an audience as though it were an individual. I regard the power to address an audience as an individual mind one essential to the success of an orator or a public speaker of any kind."

Hon. George R. Wendling says: "My experience leads me to say that there is an aggregate mind; also, that the basis for an oration to be successful must be in the common elements of the minds present in an audience. The chief basis of the aggregate mind that

I build my orations on is found in the instincts, emotions and imagination."

G. Walter Barr says: "The minds of an audience are composed of isolated individual minds, until I get them all attentive to the point of abstraction; then a fused aggregate while the great abstraction lasts."

C. L. Herrick says: "Theoretically I regard an audience composed much as the organs of the body are. Thus, while each has its own individual prejudices, each is unconsciously influenced by the supposed attitude of his neighbors and his opinions of the aggregate tendencies. This element varies with the degree of *rapport* of a lecturer and his fellows."

The Hon. Lloyd Bryce, in his recent magazine article, has the following to say on this subject: "A curious psychological study they offer, these vast assemblages. I have often imagined that the emotions of individuals are intensified by their combined number." Again, in speaking of the Omaha audience: "There was also an instinctive appreciation of an underlying sympathy with them, on the part of the speaker, which disarmed their distrusts, and the vast gathering responded to it with greater quickness and fervor than any one of them would have done individually." In another place, Mr. Bryce makes the following summary of his experience and knowledge, and of his conversations with the great actors of England, France and the United States, and of public speakers whom he has known: "Victor Hugo in his lectures used to address

himself always to the most solid countenance among his hearers, feeling if he could make an impression on him, the rest would follow. Dion Boucicault, the actor, assured me he always addressed himself to the occupants of the gallery, who, being drawn from the poor and consequently less conventional elements of society, were quicker to respond, and consequently to encourage him. A popular lecturer whom I know, regards his audience as one huge, conglomerate pink face; that smiles, that frowns, that weeps, that quivers—as a species of living, composite photograph of the whole. A clever stump-speaker, in explaining his success, attributed it to the fact that he always regarded his hearers as children, and couched his remarks in language that the juvenile mind would grasp.” And again Mr. Lloyd remarks: “‘An audience is a woman,’ a great French orator now deceased once observed to me, ‘subject to the same general rules that apply to the fickle sex. At one time it must be persuaded, at another caressed, at another bullied. It is full of moods. There is something feminine in a crowd’s emotions. The intonation of a word may cause your auditors to fawn upon you, or on the other hand, to turn around and rend you. Perhaps it is half woman and half tiger.’”

Matthews in *Oratory and Orators* says, “When it (eloquence) is armed with the thunderbolt of powerful thought, and winged with lofty feelings; when the electric current of sympathy is established and the

orator sends upon it thrill after thrill of sentiment and emotion, vibrating and pulsating to the sensibilities of his hearers, as if their very heartstrings were held in the grasp of his trembling fingers; when it strips those to whom it is addressed of their independence, invests them with its own light, and makes them obedient to a strong nature, as the mighty ocean tides follow the path of the moon; when it divests men of their peculiar qualities and affections, and turns a vast multitude into one man, giving to them one heart, one pulse, and one voice, and that an echo of the speaker's—then, indeed, it becomes not only a delight, but a power, and a power greater than kings or military chieftains can command."

Now, that we have before us the evidence of those men, who are of that only class which can furnish scientific data on our subject, let us draw the conclusions which it will warrant, and see whether we can deduce any principles. And it should be observed that the sixty-seven replies received to the questions were unanimous in the following particulars: First, each witness has plainly asserted that a group of minds known as an audience has a character, a temper, a personality, an individuality of its own. Next, that a group of minds will act as an individual under the same stimulus. Next, that an audience is apparently controlled by a set of psychical laws peculiar to itself. The mind of an audience, as we have seen, has been spoken of as a child, as a woman, as a creature half

woman, half tiger, as a pink face, as an individual, in the attempts of the different writers to express clearly their conceptions of the individuality of the aggregate mind of an audience. Furthermore, the evidence will warrant the statement that not only will a group of minds act differently from an individual, and appear as if it had a definite set of laws of its own, but that a mental aggregate will act as a unit. Lastly, each witness says, indirectly or directly, and in so many words, that such a thing as an aggregate mind exists in an audience. After making these definite statements, the majority of the writers go on to define what they mean by an aggregate mind. They are not fatalists; that is, they do not assert that the individual brains of an audience are run together into a sort of composite brain, or in other words that the aggregate mind consists in a peculiar relation of the molecules of the individual minds that compose the audience. But what they clearly mean by the aggregate mind is the common mind of the audience; a mind made up of the common mental states of the individuals present—such as the instincts, the emotions and the imagination. So this aggregate mind finds its basis in the fundamental principle which underlies the science of psychology; that is, that each individual mind possesses mental states common to all. This mind of an audience is not a physical combination of these common elements into a new brain—a resultant that is entirely different from the individual minds that com-

pose it—having an existence entirely separate from them. On the contrary, according to the view expressed in the evidence, the individuals still exist. This aggregate mind is a mental condition of the individuals of the group, brought about by their acting in unison, and by the peculiar environment under which they have been gathered together, producing a mental state in the individuals which is peculiar to a mental aggregate. When men act in unison, the common elements of the minds gathered in the group must furnish the ground of the aggregate mind. What these are is a problem of sufficient importance to be developed by itself.

By way of a summary of the question whether such a mental phenomenon as an aggregate mind exists, we are warranted in saying: First, that a group of individuals will not respond to a given stimulus in the same way as an individual will. Second, psychology shows that all individuals have similar brains and minds, and therefore have like mental states. Third, these two preceding propositions, at least in themselves, admit of the possibility of an aggregate mind. Fourth, the evidence just given above shows that not only is there a possibility of an aggregate mind, but that such a thing really exists in an audience.

While we have passed out of the realm of mere possibility, so far as the aggregate mind is concerned, and have entered the realm of reality, yet this aggregate mind has not been scientifically defined, and as yet

might be regarded as only the peculiar phenomenon of each mind of the audience having the same or similar mental states in unison, and thus producing the impression on the leader or speaker of a sort of composite or common mind. But the very fact that there is a common train of mental states in an audience when considered from a psychological standpoint, develops sufficient ground for the assertion that such a mental phenomenon as an aggregate mind can exist. The phenomenon of a number of minds experiencing like or similar mental states in unison shows an abnormal mental condition when we take the individual mind into consideration. In support of the above statements we have but to consider the known psychical laws of the individual. Left to themselves, minds follow their own initiative. The mental states among isolated individuals, from the very nature of the case, are necessarily different. When a group of minds have like mental states in unison, the cue or initiative can not be suggested to each individual by himself, but the cue or initiative must come from without the group, and must be suggested to it by a leader or speaker. So the element of suggestion comes into the problem with its attendant effects. Also in a group of minds, the individuality of a single mind is subordinate, and the common states of the group are necessarily the controlling elements in the mental aggregate. This is why there is a deficiency in the control of the individual emotion, a hyper-excitability to casual impressions; why an

audience with the same stimulus will act as an individual would not, and will answer the other problems of the phenomena peculiar to a mental aggregate.

The very gathering together of a large number of people implies a voluntary concentration of interest in a given and definite direction. A dependent mental condition exists in these individual minds, brought about by this same concentration of interest, and also by the fact that, as Leland Powers puts it, "the audience thinks the speaker knows more than they on the subject to be treated." These two elements are important factors toward the focusing of the individual minds into one train of mental states, thus bringing about the aggregate mind.

So, in conclusion to this consideration of the problem of the existence of the aggregate mind, we may assert, backed by the evidence, by common experience, and by the science of psychology, that an aggregate mind exists. Before going further, let us define what we mean by such a mind. An aggregate mind is a mental phenomenon developed when a group of individual minds—in the case under consideration, an audience—is experiencing the same train of mental states in unison, brought about by the suggestions of a leader or speaker. Such an aggregate mind finds its basis in the common mind of the group. The essential factors in the aggregate mind are: First, the dependency of the minds of the individuals of the group on the leader or speaker to suggest the common train of mental

states. Second, the belief of the individuals that the leader or speaker knows more than they on the subject to be treated. Third, the fact that the orator can use only the common mind of the audience before him as a basis of his effort. Fourth, the fact that the very gathering of a group of minds implies a voluntary concentration of interest and produces a strained abnormal mental condition, which is peculiar to mental aggregates.

The definition just given develops the necessity of considering the problem, what states of the minds of individuals are common to such an extent as to furnish the basis for an aggregate mind. In other words, we must analyze an aggregate mind into its psychical elements. This step is absolutely necessary to fill out the conception of an aggregate mind we have just worked out together. It is a problem of sufficient value to be treated by itself. We shall therefore proceed to a consideration of what these common elements are.

III

THE COMMON ELEMENTS

What are the elements of the aggregate mind? To make a clear analysis, we must know first what are the different phases of the individual mind. Having developed this, we shall have the grounds from which we may proceed to a study of the aggregate mind itself.

Modern psychology holds that the mind is made up of a connected series of mental states, wherein the old-time faculties known as the instincts, emotions, imagination, reason, willing, etc., find their play. While the science of psychology is possible only because of the fact that all individuals have similar or like mental states and brains, and that all individual minds are governed by the same set of laws; yet psychology shows also that each mind is unlike in the development of these common elements after a certain point has been reached. This differentiation gives us the individual. So, while we have individual minds, yet we have also a common mind.

The experimental school of psychology shows that the psychical element is present in the different mental states; like the instincts, the emotions, the imagination, the reason and the will, in different degrees, the

order in which they are found constituting an ascending psychic scale. The reflex actions have the least. Then comes in order the instincts, the emotions, and so on, until we reach the reason and the will.

The instincts are one of the lowest elements in the psychic scale. Man has more of them than any other animal. James defines this phase of the mind as follows: "Instinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without the foresight of the end, and without previous education in the performance. Instincts are the functional correlatives of structure. With the presence of a certain organ goes, one may say, almost always a native aptitude for its use." Some of the instincts that come directly into our problem are such as the following: imitation, emulation, sympathy, fear, acquisitiveness, play, curiosity, sociability, shyness, shame, secretiveness, love and maternal love. These and others are common to man and the lower animals to some extent, and are least affected by the individualizing tendency of each mind. The instincts will, therefore, furnish an important factor of the common mind of a group of people acting in unison.

Rev. Emory Haynes has the following to say on the instincts in a mental aggregate: "An audience appears to me like some huge animal."

Bishop C. C. McCabe says: "The instincts have a great part in the aggregate mind, either for or against the speaker."

Hon. George Wendling says on the same: "The instincts form an important basis for an oration, and are a large element in the aggregate mind—an element the speaker must never overlook."

G. Walter Barr says: "The instincts are a great factor in shaping the minds of an audience."

Hon. Lloyd Bryce says about the Omaha meeting of the last political campaign: "The hall was jammed, and as you sat on the platform you could imagine yourself on some low-lying strip of land, with an angry tidal wave ready to engulf you. When Mr. Cockran rose to speak, one unhappily-turned phrase, one single look of flinching would have precipitated a struggle which, in the crowded condition of the building, might have been attended with a panic and loss of life. As it was, the phrase was happily turned, and aroused their *curiosity*; another between the shouts attracted their *interest*; and in twenty minutes you could have heard a pin drop. Then the orator went on to chide them, and taking the late disorder as an object-lesson of what Populism would mean if enthroned at Washington, he spoke of *patriotism* and the *country endangered by anarchy*. As he proceeded, women became hysterical, and men wept, and at the close, the scene now changed from uproarious dissent to approval, swept forward and carried him in wild enthusiasm off the platform." In this description of the Omaha meeting, one can see how clearly Mr. Cockran, either consciously or unconsciously, took advantage of the instincts of his

audience to shape and control the aggregate mind before him apparently as he wished to. All the words I have italicized refer directly to the instincts.

It is clearly shown, then, that the instincts are one of the important elements common to all individual minds; that they have the least of the psychical element in them, and that they form an important factor of the aggregate mind.

Closely allied to the instincts are the emotions. James says that "instinctive reaction and emotional expressions shade imperceptibly into each other." From this interrelation of the instincts and emotions, we get expressions of grief, of shame, of fear, of love, etc. These two psychical states being so closely related, go hand in hand, and wherever we find the instincts we find the emotions; for they are practically the same thing with two faces. So the emotions also form one of the largest parts of the common mind. Let us review the evidence on this point.

Leland Powers says: "The emotions are one of the chief characteristics of the aggregate mind."

James Hedley says: "The emotions play a large part—a dangerously large part—in an aggregate mind. All people have emotions—passions;—all have not reason."

Bishop McCabe says as follows: "All audiences are capable of having their emotions stirred, and when they are wrought upon the impressions are the deepest. So the emotions furnish us with an important factor of the aggregate mind."

Some well-known man has said: "It is a truism to say that there can be no eloquence without deep feeling. It is not enough for the orator to have the ordinary passions of our nature; he must be a magazine of sensibility, an electric battery, a Leyden jar charged to a plenum. He must have an abnormal emotional system united with the mental,—a capacity of being mightily moved, so as to move mightily, and, even in the moments of the most fiery passion, to maintain his mastery over the inner storm of being,—he must have the abnormal emotional element, or he can never dominate his fellowmen by his oratory."

G. Walter Barr says: "The emotions act as a flux. They are the most potent factor in producing aggregation; i.e., the emotional aggregation has the greatest cohesion. Witness panics and mobs."

Rev. Emory Haynes says: "The emotional element plays a large part in the aggregate mind, the controlling part."

C. L. Herrick says: "The emotions are the *vis viva*."

Hon. Lloyd Bryce says: "I have often imagined the emotions of individuals are intensified by the combined numbers." In another place, "A very singular circumstance I observed about this Norfolk meeting. During its entire continuation, the audience, while subject to every other emotion, displayed no susceptibility to humor. Dion Boucicault, to whom I have already referred, once told me that during a season's performance in London he had become aware that on

certain nights his audiences would show a greater responsiveness to the humorous part of his caste, on another to the pathetic. So struck was he with this fact that he repeated it to several of his professional friends, and they resolved in their own performances to make observations and compare notes. The result was the discovery of an unmistakable uniformity of sensitiveness each evening on that part of the audiences throughout the town. I believe the cause was attributed to atmospheric influences."

So our statement that the emotions are an important factor in the aggregate mind is substantiated by the testimony of men familiar with our object of study. Owing to the fact that the mental aggregate is dependent on the speaker to suggest the cue for its common train of mental states, the emotions are an electric force, capable of being conserved to noble purposes, if rightly used, but of terrific possibilities if played upon by base men. A great deal more could be developed from the evidence with regard to the emotions and instincts in an aggregate mind, but we shall defer any further discussion of this subject till we pass to a consideration of the aggregate mind as a whole.

Hand in hand with the instincts and emotions, goes the imagination in the common mind. In an address to the Royal Society in 1859, President Sir Benjamin Brodie presented the following thoughts on the value of the imagination to man: "Lastly, physical investigation, more than anything besides, helps to teach us the

actual value and right use of the imagination—of that wondrous faculty, which left to ramble uncontrolled leads us astray into a wilderness of perplexities and errors, a land of mist and shadows; but which, properly controlled by experience and reflection, becomes the noblest attribute of man—the source of poetic genius, the instrument of discovery in science.” Since the imagination is such an elemental and important factor, we shall expect to find it a determining phase of the common mind of an audience. Let us see if this position is warranted by the evidence bearing on this subject.

Bishop C. C. McCabe says: “The imaginations play a very large part in the aggregate mind of an audience. Mental pictures skillfully drawn are an effective means to secure and hold the attention of a mental aggregate.”

James Hedley says: “The imagination plays a very large part in an aggregate mind. When aroused, the imagination fancies things are better than they really are. When pleased, it exaggerates to the advantage of the speaker.”

Hon. George R. Wendling says: “The imagination is an important element of the mental aggregate, and furnishes one of the bases in which to ground an oration.”

Leland Powers and Rev. Emory Haynes both give as their opinion derived from experience on the public platform, that the imagination is one of the chief elements of the common aggregate mind of an audience;

an element that must always be taken into consideration.

William Matthews says in his book: "Among the faculties demanded by the orator, few are more essential to high success than a lively imagination. Put an argument into concrete shape—into a lively image—and your point is half won."

Villari, in his *Life and Times of Savonarola*, brings out the following ideas on the part played by the imagination in the Friar's orations: "Suddenly Savonarola shakes off his fetters and thrusts every obstacle aside; his discourse has touched on some vital point of interest both to himself and to his audience; *colossal images present themselves to his mind*; his fancy is fired; his gestures are more animated; his eyes seem to flame; his originality is suddenly asserted; he is a great and powerful orator."

So we may conclude that the imagination, along with the instincts and emotions, is a very important element of the aggregate mind; primarily, because along with the other two, the imagination is the predominating mental state common to all individuals.

The next question we shall undertake to answer is, "What part does reasoning hold in the aggregate mind?" To approach the solution of this problem intelligently, we must understand what part reasoning plays in the ordinary mind. James defines the act of reasoning to be, "seeing relations between our psychical experiences." So reasoning depends on the following factors primarily

First, on the number and condition of the association fibers of the brain; second, on the number of the psychic experiences of the individual. As both these conditions depend upon the individual brain and individual environment and opportunity, reasoning is plainly an individual act. A group of individuals have not physical brains alike; nor have they had similar experiences. So, if reasoning is "seeing relations between our psychical experiences," then, reasoning from the very nature of the case is an individual act, and a group of minds can not think in unison. A number of individuals may think in a group, and even allow the possibility of their all arriving at the same conclusion. Yet, owing to the differences in brains and psychic experiences, each individual will have used an individual means to arrive at the common conclusion. Moreover, a group may accept the reasoning and the conclusion of a speaker as their own up to a certain point; but even here the reasoning must be indirect, for if it is direct the individuality of each auditor will be aroused, and thus the aggregate mind will be dissolved back into its original elements; i. e., the individual minds that make up the audience. So we may expect that reasoning, if it appears as an element in the aggregate mind, can occupy only an insignificant position when compared with the instincts, emotions and imagination; and that instead of being appealed to in a direct manner, as these three elements may be, will have to be appealed to indirectly, under the cover of prejudice, partisan-

ship, fear, patriotism, the imagination, or kindred states of the common mind; it depending on the audience, of course, as to which particular means of reaching the reason can be used with safety and with affect. Let us now see whether or not the evidence will support the statements just made, and if the evidence does, we shall have arrived at one principle wherein the aggregate mind is essentially different from the individual minds which compose it.

G. Walter Barr says on this subject: "Reasoning has no part in the aggregate mind, because community of attention is impossible when many minds of different logical capacity and ability are reasoning at the same time. That all are reasoning is not sufficient community of attention to make an aggregate mind. I have often taken off the aggregation of an audience by a mathematical demonstration."

C. L. Herrick says: "Reasoning is an indirect factor of the aggregate mind, utilized by imagination, the instincts and the emotions."

Dr. Peterson says: "Reason rarely enters the aggregate mind. An audience never becomes a mental unit through reasoning. An audience does not think in unison. It only feels. Reasoning is not an element of the aggregate mind."

James Hedley says on this subject: "Reasoning is only moderate in an aggregate mind. In a numerically great audience, the average of the reason is low. Gough pleased a great crowd in Boston better than

Emerson or Whipple did. Great criminal lawyers capture a jury often against the reason and facts of the case. Ingersoll wins the aggregate mind, yet he is not a reasoner."

Leland Powers has the following to say: "The reasoning faculties, I think, are distinctly personal and individual, and are contributed very sparingly to the aggregate mind. Reasoning must begin in an individual mind, and as soon as the auditor is in an argumentative state, he ceases to be really a part of the audience. He has withdrawn himself from the aggregate. The mental (psychical) faculty tends toward isolation."

Rufus Choate announces as a truism that no train of thought is too deep, or too subtle, for an orator who is a master to give to a popular audience, if the thought is presented to such a mental aggregate in the proper manner. "It should be conveyed," said he, "in anecdote or sparkling truism, or telling illustration, or stinging epithet,—never in a logical, abstract shape."

Erskine said on one occasion that Fox was the forcible speaker he was, because he passed "in the most unforeseen and fascinating review" the same arguments over and over again. Fox's own maxim was: "It is better to repeat your arguments so often that some of the audience should observe it, than that any should not understand." In one of his speeches, Fox presents the same argument in no fewer than five dif-

ferent ways before he was satisfied that it was clearly understood.

DeQuincey in justifying amplification says: "If such an orator (Lord Bacon) had labored with no other defect, had he the gift of tautology? Could he say the same thing over in direct sequence? for, without this talent of iteration,—of repeating the same thought in diversified forms—a man may utter good heads of an oration, but not an oration."

Burke, with all his "gorgeous imagery and lofty eloquence," could not hold the House of Commons long enough to deliver one of his masterly political essays. Lord Chesterfield tells us that he entered the House with awe to hear Burke, but saw that of the five hundred and sixty members, all had vanished except thirty. Mr. Rush, the American Minister, relates that Mr. Erskine told him the following: "I was in the House when Burke made his great speech on American conciliation,—the greatest he ever made,—he drove everybody away. When I read it in pamphlet form, I thumbed it to pieces by reading it over and over again."

Mr. Milner Gibson says: "I find truism the best thing for the House of Commons." Sir Henry L. Bulwer, speaking on the same subject, adds: "A learned man in that body is more likely to be wrong than any other. He fancies himself amid an assembly of meditative and philosophic statesmen; he calls up all his deepest thoughts and most refined speculations; he is

anxious to astonish by the profundity and extent of his views, the novelty and sublimity of his conceptions; the listeners are convinced he is a bore, he is satisfied that they are blockheads. . . . The House of Commons consists of a mob of gentlemen, the greater part of whom are neither without talent or information. But a mob of gentlemen is still a mob, requiring rather to be amused than to be instructed, and is only touched by those reasons and expressions, which is clear to the dullest as to the quickest intellect, and vibrate through an assembly as if it had but one ear and one mind."

Macaulay says on this lack of reasoning in an aggregate mind: "It would be as idle in an orator to waste meditation and long research on his speeches, as it would be in the manager of a theater to adorn all the crowd of courtiers and ladies who cross over the stage in a procession with pearls and diamonds."

Sir Robert Peel, who understood the mind of an audience as thoroughly as any orator ever did, said that arguments to have weight with a mental aggregate must be "such as are adapted to people who know very little of the matter, care not much about it, half of whom have dined or are going to dine, and are forcibly struck only by that which they can instantly comprehend without much trouble."

Such testimony might be multiplied *ad infinitum*. But enough has been given to show that our statements that the reasoning is not an element of the aggregate

mind is not only supported by the science of psychology, but also by the testimony of the world's greatest judges of oratory and oratorical effect. Here, for the first time in our investigation, have we found a fundamental difference between the mind of an individual and that of a mental aggregate. This difference between the two furnishes us with a phenomenon that isolates the mental aggregate from the individual mind, and gives it a personality, an individuality, and justifies the position already taken that there is enough of a difference between the individual and the mental aggregate to warrant us in studying it. We shall see how this deficiency of the reasoning power in the aggregate mind affects the solution of the problem when we come to consider the individuality of a mental aggregate as a whole.

Next, we shall consider the question of the will in the aggregate mind. James says the following on the will: "Desire, wish, will, are states of the mind which everyone knows and which no definition can make plainer. We desire to feel, to have, to do all sorts of things which at the moment are not felt, had or done. If with the desire there goes a sense that attainment is not possible, we simply wish; but if we believe that the end is in our power, we will that the desired feeling, having, or doing shall be real; and real it presently becomes, either immediately upon the willing or after certain preliminaries have been fulfilled." As the instincts, the emotions and the imagination are

peculiar to the common mind, so reasoning as we have seen, and willing as we shall see in a moment, are peculiar to the individual. Still further, it can be demonstrated that volition is more of an individual act than reasoning. As the individual brain and mind condition reasoning, so do they condition willing; though with a difference. For the reasoning of an individual depends alone on the number and physical condition of the association fibers of the brain, while the peculiar individual will depends absolutely on the physical condition of the whole brain. The experimental school of psychology has established clearly that there are five chief types of decision, each one of which may be still farther differentiated into sub-types. As a matter of fact, this school shows that there are very nearly as many wills as individuals. These types of will range all the way from the normal healthy will to the apparent loss of will through disease. And we shall consequently expect to find that the volitional element rarely enters as a factor into the aggregate mind.

Our position does not necessarily imply that an audience is incapable of willing, but only that the possibility of willing entering into the mental aggregate is very slight; because when an aggregate mind wills, it must will as a unit, as an individual, and since there is such a discordance of desires represented in a mental aggregate to be fused into one desire, and since there is so much difference as to the point in the individual

minds at which the possibility of the attainment of an end enters as a determining factor in willing, the mental state to produce action in a mental aggregate must necessarily be very intense, and from the very nature of the case can exist only on rare occasions. For this very reason the power to make an audience act upon his suggestion is the ultimate standard by which an orator is judged. The orators who have stood the test of time are those who stirred men to action by their words. The orations of Demosthenes hurled the Greeks against Philip of Macedonia, and thus saved their country from subjection. Rome points to Cicero because he aroused the Senate to the conspiracy of Catiline. Girolamo Savonarola founded the Florentine Republic by his orations. Mirabeau, until his death, the ruling spirit of the French Revolution, was the voice that guided the people during that awful period. England presents an array of orators whose speeches in Parliament have been the forge on which has been wrought the present English Constitution. Bolingbroke, Chatham, the two Pitts, Fox, Burke, and Daniel O'Connell are voices that never will be still as long as liberty reigns in the hearts of men. The orations of Patrick Henry, of Clay, of Webster, and of Wendell Phillips are so interwoven with American history that they shall always be pointed to as orators who wielded a great influence in shaping this republic. In support of these preceding statements let us resort again to the evidence.

G. Walter Barr says on the volitional element in the aggregate mind: "When the will acts in the individual, the discordance of desire back of the manifold wills usually produces a different product in each individual, and the mass containing these different lines of force breaks up into its component elements at once. If the predominant desires are uniform, and the wills therefore uniform, these parallel lines of forces add to the momentum of the mass, whatever be the direction of the latter. This condition is found, perhaps, only in mobs and panics, but is very marked there."

James Hedley says: "The volitional element has but a moderate part in an aggregate mind."

Leland Powers gives the following as his opinion: "I think the exercise of the volitional element is suspended in the aggregate mind, leaving it (the aggregate mind) very sensitive to suggestion—to such an extent, sometimes, that the audience can almost be said to be in a hypnotic condition, accepting the will of the speaker as its own, believing it to be its own."

Rev. Emory Haynes says: "The will of an aggregate mind when it acts is not a normal individual will, but impulsive, lawless, irresistible—a law unto itself."

Villari, in his *Life and Times of Savonarola*, shows us the wonderful powers the friar acquired over the wills of his auditors. He says that "the crowning marvel was to see how one man, a simple friar, swayed Florence (the city of riots) from the pulpit, and always

swayed it for good—an example without precedence in history of the might of human utterance over the human will. This friar made no harangues in the streets, had no seat in the councils of the state; yet he was the soul of the people.”

In summing up the facts bearing on the will as an element in the aggregate mind we may conclude: First, the volitional element is rarely present. This is because the mental aggregate is seldom roused to the intense psychical state necessary for a group of minds to act as an individual. Second, when the will is present, it does not act as a normal individual will, but is “impulsive, lawless, irresistible; a law unto itself,” and is very hard to control. The phenomena of panics, mobs, and church revivals; the blind charge of an army; the wild cheering and behavior of a crowd seemingly gone mad with enthusiasm; the Crusades—can be explained only when we take this law into consideration.

Another element that has a strong and determining influence on the aggregate mind, an influence that must be taken into consideration, is the peculiar narrow biases existing in the minds of an audience. As the individual is always full of prejudices and likes to have them respected and not antagonized, so an audience has the same characteristic to a great extent, though, of course, in the case of a group of minds, the narrow and controlling biases must be common to such an extent in the individuals as to furnish the ground of

the common bias in the aggregate mind. An audience, just as an individual, likes to think along the line of least resistance, and the line of least resistance in the case of both an individual and a mental aggregate is determined, to a degree, by partisan feeling, prejudices, local pride, and all the other narrow biases that hold dominion over mind. These biases are the results of mental habits of thinking.

Leland Powers says on this subject: "The narrow biases of the common or aggregate mind control it to a great degree."

G. Walter Barr says: "The narrow biases of the aggregate mind have a wonderful influence over the emotions of an audience, and as such are very important elements to be taken into consideration."

Bishop C. C. McCabe has the following to say: "The narrow biases of the aggregate mind, such as the prejudice, partisan feeling, local pride and the like, exert a great influence upon the aggregate mind, and must be taken into account by the speaker. These have a great deal to do in shaping the individuality of the mind of an audience.

Another fact that shows how the prejudice steels the the aggregate mind and sways it to the exclusion of possible conviction is afforded in our political parties and in our political campaigns. Ferguson of Pitfour, a Scotch Member of the House of Commons and a follower of the younger Pitt, expresses this law clearly by saying, "I have heard many arguments which con-

vinced my judgment, but never one that influenced my vote." The party whip, caucus, prejudices and "the dead eloquence of votes" forces home, as no other evidence does, the tremendous power the narrow biases have in shaping the individuality of an aggregate mind.

The common experience of all make any further testimony on this subject unnecessary. It is enough to add to our list of elements of the common mind which make the basis of the aggregate mind, the narrow controlling biases common to the individuals of a group. The analysis of almost every oration demonstrates clearly the general prevalence of this element in every audience.

Another determining factor which has a large part in winning and influencing an audience is *earnestness* in the speaker. As Emerson puts it: "There is no eloquence without a man behind it." This element must exist in an orator. It can be either natural—as in Wendell Phillips or Sumner, or artificial—as in Rufus Choate or Ogden Hoffman, or in most famous criminal lawyers. The audience must not believe only that the speaker knows more than it about the subject to be treated, but also, that the speaker believes what he is saying.

In final review of our consideration of the elements of the aggregate mind, we may conclude that the following principles are very firmly established: First, the chief factors of the aggregate mind are those of the

individual mind, wherein the psychic element is least. Second, these are the instincts, the emotions and the imagination—reasoning and willing enter as elements very sparingly; reasoning does not enter directly, but in some indirect manner, generally being saturated with imagination or the emotions to such an extent that the resulting mental states in the mental aggregate can hardly be called reasoning. Take the political argument, so-called, for an example. The psychological law, as we have seen, that explains the absence of reason in the aggregate mind is that reasoning is strictly an individual act, and when introduced into an aggregate mind directly will instantly develop the individual element in every mind in the group, and thus destroy aggregation. Third, willing, if it enters at all as an element in a mental aggregate, does so only rarely, and then when the group of minds is in an intense mental state. As the emotional element is the strongest, we may expect that the emotional aggregate is the most liable to act.

In these elements just developed, we have the skeleton of the aggregate mind in a heap before us, and are now ready to take the next step in developing our problem. We must put these elements together, and construct the individuality or personality of the aggregate mind, as over against the individuality or personality of the single mind. By analysis we have discovered these factors, by synthesis we must build them into a whole.

IV

THE AGGREGATE MIND CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE

Before passing to a consideration of the aggregate mind as a whole however, let us bring together the principles that we have developed so far, and thus lay a broader basis for the discussion of this particular phase of the problem. These results will be given in the logical order, and in the manner in which we discovered them.

Modern psychology shows that all minds and brains are similar—that they experience similar mental states and are governed by the same laws. A science of psychology could not otherwise exist. We find here a common ground between minds which gives at least a possibility of an aggregate mind existing in the common mental states.

Another principle of importance to be recalled is, that a group of minds will react under the same stimulus in a different manner from an individual. This phenomenon colors at least the possibility of an aggregate mind with a strong shade of reality; for it points to a set of laws governing a group of minds acting in unison, quite different from the set that controls the

action of an individual. Furthermore, the evidence will warrant the statement that all groups of minds when fused are alike, the only differences in audiences being the ease with which and the point at which aggregation will take place, these differ according to the degree of critical preadjustment that must be broken down in the individual minds of the group.

Another principle firmly established by the evidence is, that a group of minds known as an audience has "a temper, and an understanding" of its own; that a knowledge of this personality of an audience is absolutely necessary to the success of an orator, or of a public speaker of any kind. A study of the masterpieces in the field oratory will not fail to impress one strongly with the idea that the orator back of them must have had a thorough knowledge of the controlling elements in the aggregate mind, and that he knew how to handle his knowledge effectively. This evidence gives still more coloring to the reality of such a thing as a mental aggregate, and we can state definitely, if this evidence is worth anything, that such a mind exists and has a scientific ground for its existence.

Moreover, in trying clearly to express their conceptions of an aggregate mind, the different writers have compared it to a woman, a creature half woman half tiger, a huge pink face that smiles, that frowns, that weeps, that quivers, some animal, and a single individual. From this the principle can be deduced that an aggregate mind acts as an individual. If the aggregate

mind acts as an individual, the individual minds of the audience must be experiencing similar mental states. This phenomenon of a number of minds having the same mental states in unison gives an abnormal mental condition when we take the individual mind into consideration. For when left to themselves, minds follow their own initiatives, and we have as many trains of mental states as we have individuals. From the very nature of the mind, when a group of individuals have a like train of mental states, the initiative must come from without the group, and must be suggested to it by a leader or speaker. So the element of suggestion enters the problem, and the aggregate mind may be said, and has been said, to be a phase of the hypnotic state. The fixed gaze of an audience and the dependence of the will and reason of a mental aggregate, are some of the conditions that accompany the hypnotic phenomenon. But this element of suggestion in the mental aggregate, with its attendant effects will be treated more extensively later on.

Again, we have found that the very gathering together of a large number of people implies a concentration of interest in a given and definite direction; a dependent mental state in the individual minds of a group developed by this concentration of interest, and the fact, as Leland Powers puts it, that "the audience, thinks the speaker knows more than they on the subject to be treated," are two important factors constituting the necessary condition that must exist in the in-

dividual minds of an audience, to bring about aggregation at all.

Furthermore, we have shown that the experimental school of psychology gives us an ascending scale of mental states when the amount of the psychical element that each contains is taken into account. This science also gives the principle that the states which have the least of the psychical element; for example, the instincts, the emotions and the imagination,—those which approach very closely to reflex action,—are not very much affected, if at all, by the individualizing tendency of the mind that exists in the higher psychical state, and that the lower mental states are similar and common to all individuals. We have developed the principle that these lower states of the individual mind of an audience furnish the controlling elements of the common mind; that reasoning and willing, which are purely individual acts, enter very sparingly into the mental aggregate, because if they enter directly the individual minds which compose the audience, call into operation their peculiar individual habits, and thus the common mind is destroyed. The narrow biases control the aggregate mind just as they do the individual; but the biases must be common enough to the individuals of the group to enter into and influence the mental aggregate.

So far we have not developed anything very revolutionary. We have not annihilated the individual. He still exists, and must ever exist in the mental ag-

gregate. But we have developed three principles which give a scientific basis for the personality or individuality of an aggregate mind as over against the individuality of the single minds that compose it. They are: First, the dependent state of the individuals of a group on the leader or speaker, to suggest to them their common train of mental states. Second, the fact that the basis for this common train of mental states must of necessity be found in the common mind of the group. Third, the unconscious, yet intensifying influence that a group of minds exerts on the single mind by the physical and mental force accumulated around it. In these propositions we have undoubtedly before us, by implication, the characteristics of the personality of the aggregate mind, which must be unfolded in order to complete our conception of this mental phenomenon. These three propositions, briefly stated, are the suggestibility of the mental aggregate, its common mind, and the influence of a group of minds on mind. But before we pass to a separate consideration of the peculiar characteristics of the mental aggregate, let us turn to the evidence which is presented on the aggregate mind considered as a whole.

Leland Powers says on this subject: "The common characteristics of the aggregate mind are youthfulness, credulity, optimism, love of justice and fair play, belief in ideals, such elements and qualities which are dominant in the healthy youth of sixteen or twenty years of age. In fact, my experience leads me to con-

clude that the aggregate mind of an audience is that of an inexperienced and healthy young man or woman of sixteen or twenty years of age, before his belief in his enthusiasm and ideals have become weakened. For instance, if you are an elderly man of cynical turn of mind resulting from your experience in life, you find that in sitting in an audience, listening to an interesting speaker or play, your tendency is to see and hear with the eyes and ears of those about you. Your critical and personal elements are apt to be dormant until after you are apart from the audience when, again, your own personality asserts itself."

Since all the other witnesses reply to the question in practically the same words, and since common experience is the same, it is needless to reproduce the individual answers here.

It should also be remembered that in developing the instincts and emotions as elements of the mental aggregate, the various writers describe the character of an audience by comparing it to an animal, to a creature half woman half tiger, to a face, to a woman, to a child. In the light of this, it will be readily seen that Leland Powers is very nearly right in his summary of the characteristics of an audience as a whole, as being those of a youth of sixteen or twenty years. This evidence, supported by experience, is justified also by the science of psychology. The instincts, the emotions and the imagination which form the controlling elements of a youth are also the controlling elements of

the common mind, which is the basis of the aggregate mind. To get a clear insight into what is meant by giving the character of an audience as that of a child, let us have the answers of the different writers to the question, "Is the aggregate mind higher or lower than the individual mind of the audience?" From this we may gain some inkling of this general characteristic known as a child-character, and why it has been applied to a mental aggregate.

James Hedley says: "The aggregate mind is lower than the individual mind. In a vast assembly there are not very many thinkers. The larger the audience, the easier the chance for success."

Leland Powers says: "The aggregate mind is not as intellectual or discriminating, but more idealistic than the individual mind. A speaker can give expression to high and noble sentiments before an audience that he would find difficult to express to or be appreciated by, any single auditor if alone with him."

Bishop C. C. McCabe says: "The aggregate mind is lower, and it is in the control of the speaker to shape it."

Dr. Peterson says: "It is lower. The aggregate mind is dependent and passive, and easily molded by the orator."

Rev. Emory Haynes says: "The aggregate mind is lower; it is childlike."

Ex-President Harrison, writing in the *Ladies' Home Journal* on "The House of Representatives," has the following to say, which bears directly on the subject in

hand: "It has been said that every public assembly is a mob, and there have been frequent occasions when the casual visitor to the gallery of the House of Representatives would find in what he saw a verification of the same. The size of the House requires more stringent rules—that the Speaker have a control of the proceedings that would neither be needed nor tolerated in a smaller body. The previous question or some form of cloture is essential to so large a body."

Sir Henry Maine, in his *Popular Government*, brings the following obstacles forward in the way of a democracy: "If you place power in men's hands, they will use it for their interest. Applying this rule to the whole of a political community, we ought to have a perfect system of government; but taking it in connection with the fact that multitudes include too much ignorance to be capable of understanding their interests, it furnishes the principal argument against democracy. Under the shelter of one government, as of the others, all sorts of selfish interests breed and multiply, speculating on its own weaknesses and pretending to be its servants, agents and delegates. Nevertheless, after making all due qualifications, I do not deny at all to democracy some portion of the advantage which so masculine a thinker as Bentham claimed for them. But putting this advantage at the highest, it is more than compensated by one great disadvantage. Of all the forms of government, democracy is by far the most difficult. Little as a governing multitude is con-

scious of this difficulty, prone as the masses are to aggravate it by their avidity for taking more and more power into their direct management, it is a fact which experience has placed beyond all dispute. It is the difficulty of democratic government that mainly accounts for its ephemeral duration. This greatest, most permanent and most fundamental of all the difficulties lies deep in the constitution of human nature. Democracy is a form of government, and all forms of government, acts of state are determined by an exertion of will. But in what sense can a multitude exercise volition? No doubt the vulgar opinion is that the multitude makes up its mind as the individual makes up his mind. A host of popular phrases testify to this belief. 'The will of the people,' 'Public opinion,' 'Vox populi, vox Dei,' belong to this class. But what do such questions mean? They must mean that a great number of people on a great number of questions can come to an identical conclusion, and find an identical determination upon it. The truth is that the modern enthusiasts make one fundamental confusion. They mix up the theory that the demos is capable of volition, with the fact that it is capable of adopting the opinions of one man or of a limited number of men, and of founding direction to its instruments upon them."

From the above evidence and argument we may conclude, with Leland Powers, that the aggregate mind of an audience is the mind of an inexperienced and

healthy young person of sixteen or twenty years of age, before his belief in his enthusiasm and ideals has become weakened.

Now let us return to the three essential propositions which, as we found a moment ago, give the aggregate mind its individuality; namely, the suggestibility of the mental aggregate, its common mind, and the influence of minds upon mind.

Let us enlarge on the first one, and thus get its full meaning and import. The first proposition is as follows: The absolute dependence of the mental aggregate on the leader or the speaker to suggest to them the common train of mental states which they shall experience in unison. The psychological law which makes the mental aggregate dependent on the speaker is, that left to themselves, individual minds follow their own mental cue, and we have as many different trains of thought as individuals. When a group of minds have like mental states in unison, the cue must come from outside the group. It must be suggested to it. This common train of mental states may be suggested to a mental aggregate, not only by words, but by objects, events, or other similar means—a mob or a panic is generally started in some other manner than by words—a tongue of fire in a theater for instance, but in an audience words are the principal instruments, though some physical means, as expression of the face, gesture, and poses are important and have their place as an aid to the words.

So, in a general way, the idea of suggestion has been alluded to. Since the far-reaching influence of suggestion is not generally known, and as the very mention of this power usually awakens prejudice based on ignorance, we shall devote a paragraph or two to clear up the popular conception of suggestion.

We have only to glance at social relations, in order to see that individuals fall into two classes, the leader and the led ; that is, the giver and the recipient of suggestions. While hypnotism has nearly monopolized the word and has developed the general idea that suggestion is possible only in an abnormal mental condition, such as exist in a hypnotic subject or in some diseases, yet the science of hypnotism as well as the experimental school of psychology, have clearly established the fact that suggestion exerts a wonderful influence over sound minds as well as over those in an abnormal condition, and that this power seemingly holds universal dominion ; that in our day, suggestion is being accepted as one of the principal means to employ in building character ; especially is this so in regard to the educational method in vogue.

The accepted definition of suggestion among psychologists and hypnotists is that it consists "in introducing, cultivating and confirming an idea in the minds of the subject, or subjects, of experiment. In reply to the inquiry what is meant by an idea and what latent force does it possess in order to affect some individuals so powerfully, we must repeat that the idea resolves itself

into an image, and the image into the revival of sensation. It consists in the psychical renewal of a peripheral sensation already experienced by the subject. This enables us to understand its power; the idea is, strictly speaking, only an appearance; but there lurks behind it the energy excited by a physical anterior excitement."

So, in general, we may observe that suggestion is universal in society—which is divided by it into the leaders and the led; that it controls childhood, in which character and the will have not yet been developed; that even in adult life, when character, habits, will and reason have been fixed, and the power of suggestion is nearly destroyed, seemingly, yet it is really held only in subjection, and is called forth when the force of habits, reason and will, as conservative factors, have been weakened. Such conditions are furnished in some diseases, like hysteria, in most excitements—as mobs and panics, and in the environment of an audience.

It may seem strange that a mental aggregate will furnish, probably, the best condition we have for the development of the mental state called susceptibility in the normal mind. Yet this is true. The psychological reason for this is, that practically the same conditions exist in an audience that must exist between a hypnotist and his subjects; namely, the voluntary dependence of the audience on the speaker, and the seeming acceptance of the will and reasoning of the

speaker for its own. Of course, there is a difference in the degree that the power of suggestion holds over the hypnotic subject and that it holds over the audience, but it is a difference only of degree—the conditions in both cases are the same, and the results are similar. In the hypnotic subject, the will of the hypnotist has become the will of the subject completely. In the aggregate mind of an audience, the will and reason of the aggregate mind have become the speaker's, in so far as he stays within the common mind, and employs only the elements of the aggregate mind. In doing so he does not arouse the individual wills and reasons of the individuals which compose the group. This influence which the crowd exerts in heightening the suggestibility of the individual minds of an audience is very clearly stated by Professor Edward A. Ross, in an article entitled "The Mob Mind," in the July (1897) number of the *Popular Science Monthly*. He puts it as follows: "The inhibitive power which measures our ability to go our own way undisturbed grows with the number and variety of the suggestions that reach us. This may be because conflicting suggestions block each other off. The power of independent choice seems to develop best when the clash of suggestion reduces to a minimum the ascendancy of the outer world over the individual. This is why age, travel and contact with affairs build up character. But when numerous identical suggestions beset one, one's power of resistance is gradually undermined. As many taps of a hammer

fractures the boulder, so the onset of multitudinous suggestions break the strongest will. Men who can readily throw off the thousand suggestions of everyday life will be quite swept away by the reiteration of the single idea from all sides. As a mighty organ compels even benches and windows to vibrate in unison with it, so the crowd dominated by a single mood emits a volume of suggestion that gives an emotional pitch and tone to every individual in it. Besides the volume of suggestibility possible, there is usually a condition of excitement or expectancy. Frequently, too, there is a pressure on the body which prevents voluntary movement while conveying promptly to each, all those electrifying swayings and tremors that express the emotion of a mass. The merely physical contact in the excited crowd, therefore, provides certain conditions of suggestibility."

The existence of a group of minds does not necessarily mean the existence of an aggregate mind. It takes time to form a mental aggregate, as can be seen in an audience when falling under the influence of an orator, or in a congregation developing the revival spirit under the pressure of continued appeals. A crowd does not become panic-stricken in an instant. There is a stage of wavering or uncertainty in the individual minds of the mass before the development of an aggregate mind is reached. This is very clearly illustrated when a mental aggregate breaks into the individual minds that compose it. Who has not felt and seen the

wavering condition of an audience when coming out from under the spell of an orator, as each individual seems to be readjusting his personality, preparatory to leaving the hall. In addition to the fact already noticed that there is not an instantaneous fusing of all individual minds into an aggregate mind, it should be observed that the process of fusing is through a series of groups; those persons nearest the speaker fusing first, and then the next group around this one being influenced. Thus, the suggestion is caught up group after group, or belt after belt, extending outward until the whole audience is under the influence of it. As the number of people increases, the power of suggestion is intensified, the outer groups are influenced by it much more easily than the first inner one was. Take, for example, an audience that has come early; say, for the purpose of getting seats. There are a large number of people in the auditorium, but as yet there is no aggregate mind. As many different trains of mental states exist as there are individuals, because every individual present, to some extent at least, controls and directs his own mental states. Let one mind in the audience discover smoke, for example, coming through a crack in the floor. As long as he keeps this discovery to himself, there is yet no aggregate mind formed; but let the smoke become visible to the audience, the idea of fire is instantly suggested to the nearest group. This feeling immediately extends to the other minds in the audience, until there is complete unanimity. When the single

mind perceives that the others feel as he does, he feels more intensely; then the audience feels in unison. Then the instinct of self-preservation is suggested instantaneously to the common mind unconsciously, and, as an individual, the audience is panic-stricken, and attempts to escape. The intensity of the aggregate mind will depend upon the demonstrated difficulty of escape and the number of individuals in the group. The same effect would be produced if any other means were taken to suggest fire. For instance, suppose some one had shouted the word, "fire;" or again, suppose a lamp had exploded.

But let us say there had been no fire and no suggestion of fire; we still have the group of individuals in the auditorium waiting for eight o'clock to strike. What does this crowd imply? In the first place, a voluntary concentration of interest in one direction, which will turn into voluntary attention when the speaker begins; in the second place, the dependent condition of the individuals present for their common train of mental states to be suggested to them by the speaker. Another factor present in the individual mind which aids the development of this dependent condition is the belief that the speaker of the evening knows more than his auditors on the subject to be treated. So, in this voluntary concentration, the voluntary attention, and the accompanying dependent state of the individual minds, we have all the essential conditions of suggestion. The orator of the evening

steps on the platform with the ground potentially prepared before him; all he has to do is to develop this by suggestion in order to control and shape the aggregate mind for his purposes.

The reason why this concrete example of an audience has been given is to drive home clearly the part that suggestion with its attendant consequences plays in the mental aggregate. Enough now of suggestion. Let us turn our attention to the second proposition.

This proposition, which is an important factor in determining the personality in the aggregate mind, runs as follows: the basis of a common train of mental states must, of necessity, be found in the common mind of the individuals present in the group, and for the same reason the elements of the common mind are the only ones that can be employed in the aggregate mind. We have already developed by analysis the elements which form the common mind. Now we must put them together into a whole, and study the results thoroughly. First, let us recall that the common mind is similar to the mind of an inexperienced, idealistic, healthy youth, between the years of sixteen and twenty; that experience as well as the science of psychology supports this statement. Let us remember that the principal and controlling elements of the common mind are the instincts, the emotions and the imagination; while the reason and will enter very sparingly and then only indirectly into it. This peculiar combination of the five elements in the common mind

in which each possesses a relative importance altogether different from that belonging to it in the individual, furnishes a very interesting factor which exerts a determining influence on the individuality of the aggregate mind. We shall discuss this later.

The common mind of an audience, while it is fixed as to the number of elements that can compose it, is yet a very uncertain factor, perhaps, when we take into consideration the relative value of the different mental elements that enter into combination to form it, which depends wholly on the audience. A New England environment of thought and ideality produces a different aggregate mind from that encountered in the Pennsylvania coal regions. The individual still exists, however; the common mind is nothing more than the individual minds acting in unison, with the peculiar individualizing mental states subconscious or inactive. Of course this produces a mental condition entirely different from that of an individual mind acting by itself. Thus, we have another important factor which, along with its suggestibility, marks the personality of an aggregate mind.

The common mind finds its psychological basis in the fact that the orator is suggesting a single train of mental states to a group of minds, and that he must use in doing so only the common mind before him. Hon. George R. Wendling expresses this thought clearly when he says: "An oration must be based on the common mind of an audience, to be successful.

This common mind is founded in the instincts, the emotions and the imagination. These three mental states alone can be appealed to directly. All the others must be appealed to in some indirect manner." So we may conclude that the common mind is a fluctuating means to an end—the particular common mind depending on the audience, and the means to the end being the psychological basis of an attempt to suggest and influence a mass of minds acting in unison.

Next, let us consider why the aggregate mind of an audience will react against the same stimulus in a way entirely different from an individual mind. The primary reason for this is, as we have already established, that the aggregate mind finds its basis in the common mind in the audience; or, in other words, the basis of an oration or any public address, lies in the common mental states of all the individuals present. The predominating and controlling states of the common mind are, as we have seen, the instincts, the emotions, and the imagination; or, the same states that control an idealistic, inexperienced youth of sixteen or twenty. Into the life of a youth controlled by these states, reason and an individual will have not entered to any extent. Such a person is unstable, and we may say that his character has not yet been formed. So the aggregate mind, controlled as it is by the instincts, emotions and imagination, the same that control the youth, is like him easily swayed and influenced by suggestion, and what is taken for the will and reason in

the aggregate mind is only imitation, and the substituting and accepting for its own, the will and reason of some leader or speaker. The strongest characteristic of the mental aggregate is this want of any fixed character. Public opinion, which is the expression of an aggregate mind, is notoriously the most unreliable of mental phenomena, and seemingly changes with the wind. As to the pliability of the aggregate mind, let us see what the evidence says:

Leland Powers says: "The aggregate mind is credulous, and generally looks at the speaker as knowing more about the subject in hand than it, or why is he the speaker? The speaker has now only to make the aggregate mind believe a thing is good, and it will turn in that direction, and by virtue of the mental attitude of the speaker and audience it is easier for the speaker to make the aggregate mind believe a thing is good than to make any individual in the audience believe so. I give this, not as a theory, but as something I have found to be a fact in my own experience with audiences."

Professor Edward A. Ross says: "Fickleness and unstability characterize the mob simply because mood changes promptly with every change in the nature of suggestion."

Rev. Emory Haynes says: "An aggregate mind is very pliable to one who is capable of mastering and shaping it."

James Hedley says: "The aggregate mind is very

pliable. The popular orator is therefore responsible for much. I look upon the platform as the wider pulpit and approach it with reverence."

Emerson in one of his books says: "I have heard it repeated of an eloquent speaker, whose voice is now forgotten in this city (Boston), that, on occasions of death or tragic disaster which overspread the congregation with gloom, he ascended the pulpit with more than his usual alacrity, and, turning to his favorite lessons of devout and jubilant thanksgiving,—'Let us praise the Lord'—carried audience, mourners and mourning along with him, and swept away all the impertinence of private sorrow with his hosannas and songs of praise."

The idea of the pliability of the mental aggregate is too apparent to need any more evidence. This element is the life, the heart of oratory; it gives oratory its main reason for existing, in that oratory furnishes a powerful means of influencing the individual. History and the life of every orator bears out this statement; for example, take the Lord John Gordon's riot in England, Bryan's nomination in 1896, the Coxey army movement, all fads and fashions. Recall that Wendell Phillips and Henry Ward Beecher on numerous occasions did with their audiences what they could not do with the individuals of the groups by themselves.

We shall now consider the third proposition; namely, the influence that a group of minds exerts on the in-

dividual minds that compose it. The rule that we hear and see with the eyes and ears of those about us as well as with our own, contains the truth we are seeking after. The individual acting by himself has a subjective standard—he sees and hears with his own eyes; but the same individual acting in a group has an objective standard—he sees and hears in a large degree with the eyes and ears of those around him. This effect of masses of minds on the single mind is seen not only in man, but in animals as well. For example, birds act with an apparent objective standard when in a group—the most insignificant cause will set the whole flock in a state of excitement. Cattle in herds are controlled by this contagion of body and mind also. Small causes will start a wild stampede. On no other ground can the actions of animals in groups be explained than that the mere accumulation of physical force, as well as mental, intensifies the whole mental aggregate. This influence of mind on mind is seen on every hand. A person who never would, or could sing a solo, shouts away in a church congregation. In lynching parties, and the White Caps, we see how minds acting together in these groups influence the individual to such an extent as seemingly to substitute another objective moral standard for the subjective individual standard upon which he acts every day. Individuals do in groups what they never would do by themselves.

As a matter of fact, every time individuals come

together they must sacrifice some of their personality to get along. Society is built on this principle. In thus sacrificing their subjective or personal standard, personal responsibility is shifted and falls on the whole mental aggregate. The principal effect on the individual minds of the accumulated mental and physical force around them is mental intimidation. So the morals of the mental aggregate will be different from those of the individual. They will either be higher or lower.

Let us inquire further into the moral qualities of the crowd, and endeavor to explain the conditions under which they will be higher, or lower, than the morals of the individuals composing it, and seek the scientific reasons for this peculiar phenomenon. Professor Edward A. Ross, in speaking of the morals of the mob mind, has the following to say: "More than any other animal, man is restrained by a morality founded not on impulse, but on discipline. Animal morality is mainly the prompting of fellow-feeling. By the long pressure of an artificial environment, man is brought to submit himself to the constant sway of the moral code often quite alien to his impulses. Remove the fear of the consequences by the anonymity of the crowd. Take away the sense of personal responsibility by the participation of numbers, and people will step by step descend into depths of evil-doing and violence that measure how far their prevailing inclinations lie below the moral standard which social pressure has

forced upon them. Animals, because they have been less moralized than men, rarely show any such collective demoralization." But we are of the opinion that Professor Ross has stated only a half truth about the morality, or rather lack of morality of the mob mind when he says: "Remove the fear of the consequences by the anonymity of the crowd, take away the sense of personal responsibility by the participation of numbers, and people will step by step descend into depths of evil-doing and violence that measure how far their prevailing inclinations lie below the moral standard which social pressure has forced upon them." Here he has taken a particular phenomenon and asserted it as a general rule. As a matter of fact, a group of minds working in unison can reach a much higher moral plane than the average individual of the audience. It is true that a mental aggregate can ascend as well as descend in the moral scale. As we have seen, the aggregate mind finds its life in the common mind, and the common mind is the same as that of an idealistic, inexperienced youth. So the aggregate mind may swing to the extreme of idealism much more easily than it can swing to the extreme of immorality. Let us inquire further into what the evidence says on the morality of the aggregate mind.

Rev. Emory Haynes says: "The moral tone of an aggregate mind is generally high and generous."

Dr. Peterson says: "The moral standard of an audience is just as high or low as the aggregate standard of

the individual minds plus the efforts of the speaker for better or for worse. An accidental audience on the street arrested by the fervent appeal of an itinerant exhorter, may strip itself of money and jewels to aid the cause of morality and religion. The same sort of an audience assembled under similar circumstances, by the harangue of a red-handed nihilist, may start to pillaging, burning and murdering. The one audience may kneel with reverence on the stones of the streets, and the other may tear them up to use in building barricades and slaying their fellow-mortals."

Leland Powers says: "The moral standard of an audience is high and unselfish; a speaker can give expression to high and noble sentiments before an audience that he would find difficult to express to or be appreciated by any single auditor if alone with him."

Bishop C. C. McCabe says: "The morality of an audience is certainly owing to the environment of an audience, and it is the duty of the speaker to raise it."

G. Walter Barr says: "Correlative with the individuals; selfish because the majority of the component individuals are so."

It is clearly seen from this evidence that mental intimidation when added to the common mind does not necessarily make the group more immoral than the average individual who composes it. But the element of suggestion brings in the determining factor which shapes the morality of a group of minds to some extent. Yet the leader or speaker can not suggest any-

thing very violent in its nature unless the group is in a very intense mental condition, without arousing the animosity of the individuals and thus destroying the aggregation.

We may also state from the evidence that a mental aggregate has perhaps naturally a higher moral standard than the average individual mind present, but that suggestion alone shapes it. This gives additional meaning to the words of James Hedley when he says: "I regard the public platform as a wider pulpit, and always approach it with reverence."

We are done with considering the aggregate mind as a whole. No further reiteration of principles is needed. The following poem called forth by an unfinished figure of "Morn" on the tomb of Lorenzo de Medici at Florence may be used to illustrate the full potentiality and possibility of the aggregate mind as it lies waiting the suggestion of an inspiring orator:

"Unfinished? Nay, the Dawn is but a soul
That hovers doubtful in the mortal air:
'Tis we who mold and shape the perfect whole
And weave each day her garments fine and fair,
A face half seen, with wistful, kindling eyes
That woos and beckons but eludes us still:
Out of the brooding, pulsing dark she cries,
'Lo, I am born, come clothe me as you will'."

V

EPILOGUE

The reader of the preceding pages must keep in mind that profound maxim of Coleridge;—"There are errors which no wise man will treat with rudeness, while there is a probability that they may be the refraction of some great truth still below the horizon." The subject treated is but a part of a large whole. The psychology of the aggregate mind is as vast as the myriad relations of man and man. The audience is but one phase of a mental aggregate and is far from containing in itself all the grounds of this peculiar mental phenomenon. Let us hope that the chief value of this essay, outside of the scientific principles established, lies in its suggestiveness,—a feature that is the best part of any book for the mind of the reader. We have merely blazed a pathway through an undeveloped country, as vast in resources as it is in extent. At every step great undeveloped fields of thought have been mentioned only to be passed by.

As regards the moral of our facts. The aggregate mind of an audience has been, and must ever be, an effective means of influencing people—since it is, as we have seen, a means peculiar to itself—a means

which no other mental condition can supply; on account of its intense suggestibility, it is a very sacred means, and should be used only by men who understand what a curious, delicate, unstable mechanism they are working with. A great deal of harm has been done, and will probably ever be done, in political meetings, newspapers, revivals, and similar potent agencies for controlling the various sorts of aggregate mind, through a seemingly criminal use of the means of reaching and influencing people in masses. As well might the sacredness of the minds of the children be played with and perverted, as that the aggregate mind be made a tool of for low, base purposes, whether by the conscious or unconscious use of the means of controlling and shaping the various mental aggregates.